Epstein and Segal have produced an easy to read primer on the judicial appointment process. The authors show the intertwining influences of the President and Senate and their role in the ideology and politics of the justices and (to a lesser extent) judges approved to sit on U.S. federal courts.

Common sense dictates that Presidents nominate nominees who are close ideologically to their own views. Epstein and Segal show this to be true. Common sense would also dictate the difficulty if such considerations are taken into account as a president nominating a judge to the state where senators of his own party hold seats (and senatorial courtesy plays a stronger role), if the senate and president are of differing parties, and so forth.

Epstein and Segal have produced a primer for those interested in motivations in nominations to the court and the inherently political considerations that must be taken into account. I highly recommend this book.

Over the last five years, we have seen a consistent debate concerning judicial appointments and politics ranging from the filibusters over circuit nominees to the recent Roberts and Alito nominations. The persistent myth is that the outright influence of partisan politics on judicial nominations is a new development; that prior to the last 30 years or so, judicial nominees were only judged on the basis of qualifications and not ideology. In this book, two preeminent political scientists demonstrate that this is empirically false: while qualifications are not irrelevant, the consistently dominant factor in judicial appointments has always been politics, especially on the Supreme Court. One has only to point to the very first nomination defeated in 1795 when Washington's nominee for chief justice was defeated because he supported a politically unpopular treaty. What Epstein and Segal demonstrate is that political concerns infuse the appointments process from the very beginning and the voting of judges, at least on the Supreme Court, usually correlates to the political beliefs of the appointing president. Usefully, they also examine the lower federal courts in demonstrating how various political factors come into play in these comparatively understudied courts.

In total, Epstein and Segal have produced an excellent, brief study that is empirically sound and unbiased. While current Republicans are shown to be hypocrites, the same is dealt to Democrats. For example, many of the Democrats pushing filibusters recently complained strongly against this practice when Republicans used it in the 90s; many Republicans who complained about stalling in the Bush I administration, used the same tactics during the Clinton years and then changed the rules to make the Bush II administration's appointments easier. This is a treasure trove of empirical analysis of appointments that will not disappoint anyone looking for the facts of the situation instead of partisan talking points.

This is just an extraordinary book on judicial appointments written authors, are sprinkled throughout the discussion (e.g., no more than 20% of lower court nominations have generated any opposition). The authors' discussion of "do Presidents get what they want?" in making nominations, and if so, for how long, is particularly effective. After all, how accurately can Presidents, Senators or the rest of us predict how a nominee will perform once safely on the bench? A most timely contribution given the current Roberts nomination process and the unknown Associate Justice nominee yet to come.